Until recently, the political influence of trade unions primarily relied on ties to labour-friendly political parties. Since the 1990s, however, party-union relations have deteriorated, forcing unions to consider complementary political strategies.
between six and nine national referenda per year in the 28 EU Member States between 1990 and 2016. This rise is surprising given the recurrent accounts of a crisis of democracy, due to globalisation, Europeanisation and the corresponding decline in political leaders' responsiveness towards their electorates. And yet the trend towards post-democracy also seems to have increased the need of political leaders to seek additional direct democratic legitimisation for contentious policy decisions, for example, regarding the EU integration process.
The declining responsiveness of political leaders has also led to increased demands for direct citizen participation from below. This is notable even in Germany, where there has not been a single national referendum since the Second World War. But whereas proposals to introduce direct democratic instruments at the national level failed to get the required two-thirds majority support in the federal parliament, there has been a dramatic increase in direct democracy at the regional and local levels. In several Bundesländer and municipalities social movements, unions and civic groups, such as Mehr The increased need for additional democratic legitimacy also led to changes in the EU Treaties. In order to keep abreast with the growing transnationalisation of national economies, transnational social movements, such as Eurotopia (1995) , called in the mid-1990s for the introduction of direct democratic citizenship rights at EU level, as documented in a volume on transnational democracy sponsored by the Hans Böckler Foundation of the DGB (Erne et al., 1995) . A watered-down version of the Eurotopia proposals was taken up by the Austrian and Italian governments during the subsequent Inter-Governmental Conference that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. European political leaders, however, conceded only the first 'baby steps' (Kaufmann, 2012) towards European direct democratic citizenship rights at the Convention on the Future of Europe, which was asked to produce a draft EU Constitution (Papadopoulos, 2005) . After the failed referenda on the draft EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the Lisbon Treaty nevertheless introduced the first element of transnational direct democracy -the direct democracy for union action in the political sphere, however, we must distinguish between different types of direct democracy.
Who decides whether a popular vote has to take place? This is the key question for many typologies of direct democracy (Erne, 2002) . A vote can be triggered 'from above', namely by a constitutional requirement (mandatory referendum) or by an ad hoc decision of the executive (plebiscite). Or it can be called from below, by a number of citizens (citizens' initiatives and facultative referendum).
To the latter, we may add the ECI, which does not force the Commission to make a legislative proposal, but nevertheless exerts considerable agenda-setting pressure, as shown by the Commission's relatively positive response to the right2water ECI (European Commission, 2017), but also the Commission's invalid attempt to declare the troublesome 'Stop TTIP' ECI inadmissible. The next sections therefore review the different logics behind different direct democratic procedures before assessing their implications for unions and union action.
Direct democracy from above: mandatory referenda and plebiscites
Mandatory referenda are votes that are required by law. This normally applies to changes in the fundamental rules of a polity, such as a complete or partial revision of the constitution. Mandatory referenda are found in 16 European states, but the circumstances that trigger a popular vote vary substantially from country to country. The Swiss and Irish constitutions require a mandatory vote on every change of the constitution. In Italy, the government can pre-empt a popular vote, if a constitutional law is voted by a qualified majority in each of the two chambers of parliament. A popular vote will also take place only if one-fifth of a chamber of parliament or 500,000 citizens request it. This happened in December 2016, when Prime Minister Renzi sought a fundamental revision of the Italian constitution.
The Italian case shows also that votes on constitutional issues may be 'mandatory' in political rather than strictly legal terms. The principle that fundamental decisions have to be taken by the people themselves is widely accepted across Europe. It has been followed even in countries that do not allow for mandatory referenda in their constitutions. This short account highlights the need to distinguish plebiscites from other forms of direct democracy. In a plebiscitary democracy, a responsible body can call for a referendum from above, which often happens in situations of crisis in order to safeguard power. Therefore the term 'plebiscitary' should not be used to describe votes triggered from below (initiative, facultative referendum). They are, in contrast to the plebiscite, part of a political culture that aims to limit top-down government. After all, the plebiscite is the only type of popular 'consultation' that has also been used by dictators, from Napoleon III to Pinochet (Erne, 2002) .
Direct democracy from above -trade union experiences
Our discussion of referenda triggered from above seems to suggest that unions have little to gain from increased use of such procedures. After all, popular votes called by political leaders are aimed first and foremost at legitimising their political decisions, which seems to leave little room for autonomous union action.
However, a negative referendum outcome can terminate the political career of the leader who called it. The list of political leaders forced to resign after a referendum defeat is impressive. It ranges from General De Gaulle in the 1960s to David Cameron and Matteo Renzi in more recent times. Furthermore, the material issues that are at stake in a particular referendum may also be so important for a country that its political leadership cannot easily risk a referendum defeat. These circumstances give unions a lever that could be used to extract government concessions in exchange for union support in a given referendum campaign. The capacity to secure political exchanges in a direct democracy, however, also depends on enabling associational properties. They very much mirror the idealtypical cluster of conditions identified by scholars of neo-corporatism (Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 4) . Unions' capacity to secure favourable political exchanges in a direct democracy also very much depend on organised labour's capacity to act in unison. But whereas neo-corporatist political exchanges also require 'some degree of heteronomy with regard to the selection of [union] 
Direct democracy from below: initiatives and facultative referenda
In this section we look at votes that are held because a quorum of citizens have requested it. Two cases can be distinguished, namely the facultative referendum and the initiative. In the case of the facultative referendum, a bill passed by parliament becomes subject to a popular vote if asked for by a minimum number of citizens set out by law. In the case of an initiative, a certain number of citizens can request a popular vote on a proposition formulated by the initiators of the initiative themselves.
The initiative stands at the beginning of a political process. It fulfils a proactive function in that process as it draws attention to topics neglected by political parties. Hence, initiatives may have a political impact even if they fail at the ballot box, as they force new topics onto the political agenda. For this reason, the European Citizens' Initiative also merits discussion under this heading, even if ECIs do not lead to popular votes. By contrast, the facultative referendum stands at the end of a political process, as it submits a law voted by parliament to a popular vote. The facultative referendum functions therefore as a mechanism to hold political leaders publicly accountable. Accordingly, it has been interpreted as a conservative tool, even if the popular vetoes exercised by facultative referenda increasingly also concern progressive causes, such as the protection of public services from privatisation in German Länder (Greer, 2008) or the defence of social security systems from neoliberal assault in Slovenia and Switzerland.
Overall, facultative referenda oblige political leaders to seek broad compromises that include all relevant social interests, including organised labour.
The first experiences with direct democracy from below -in a modern sense -go back to the democratic supporters of the French Revolution. Condorcet, a leading politician of the Girondins, promoted the introduction of the facultative referendum into the new Constitution approved by the people in 1793. However, the Constitution was never put into practice as the counter-revolutionary wars allowed the Jacobin leadership to prevent its coming into force. After that, citizen- The concrete forms of these popular rights, however, vary markedly across countries. In Switzerland and in most German Länder, parliament and government play an important role in the direct democratic process. Citizen's initiatives are debated in parliament, which enables parliaments to propose direct or indirect counterproposals that may also become subject to a popular vote. By contrast, in most US states, direct democratic procedures bypass 'parliament', which produces quite antagonistic and uncoordinated political processes. Other major differences that have a substantial impact on direct democratic processes include, for example, admission quorums, signature collection periods, as well as permissible topics of popular initiatives.
Italy, the EU state with the largest experience of direct democracy, has a specific instance of the facultative referendum, the so-called abrogative ('abolishing') referendum. Article 75 of the Italian Constitution allows 500,000 citizens (or five regional parliaments) to ask for the total or partial abrogation of a national law that is already in force. This differs from the facultative referendum in Switzerland that provides a vote before a new law comes into force. All existing laws can be made subject to an abrogative referendum. In addition, the Italian abrogative referendum also allows a vote on the deletion of a single article of a given law. In this way, the sense of the law can be altered. It can therefore be difficult to distinguish the abrogative referendum from an initiative in some cases. The 
Direct democracy from below: trade union experiences
Our assessment of direct democracy from below distinguishes two sets of situations: (i) defensive and (ii) offensive circumstances. The former includes referenda called to veto or annul existing laws. The latter encompasses cases in which unions collected enough signatures to propose a new regulation. Our review of defensive cases suggests that unions often use direct democratic procedures to prevent a worsening of working and living conditions. This is evident in cases where their campaign targeted public sector privatisations or a worsening of pension and other social security entitlements.
Defending existing working and living conditions
The direct democratic campaign of the German service sector union ver.di against hospital privatisations in Hamburg is an interesting case in point. Hospital privatisations virtually came to a halt across Germany after unions won this important referendum battle against the Social Democratic government in this city-state (Greer, 2008) . Similar direct democratic pro-public sector campaigns were also successful in other German Länder and municipalities (Rehmet, 2017), for example, in favour of public water services in the Land of Berlin. The success of the Berlin water campaign is indeed astonishing, considering the opposition from Berlin's SPD-CDU grand coalition government. The Berlin public water campaign, which was supported by ver.di, struck a chord with large sections of the public (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014; Dobner, 2013; Bieler, 2017) .
In Switzerland, unilateral pension reforms and public sector privatisations are also off the agenda after important referendum victories by organised labour at local, cantonal and national level. This is indeed noteworthy as European countries with a much higher share of centre-left parties in parliament and higher union density rates than Switzerland have increased the pension age to 67. The existence of the facultative referendum in Switzerland simply disallowed the imposition of unilateral changes against the will of organised labour, given the proven capacity of organised labour to win referenda against unilateral social security reforms (Häusermann, 2010) . The same also applies to Slovenia, where voters -in a union-supported referendum from below -rejected a unilateral pension 'reform' in 2011, which would also have led to a higher retirement age (Stanojević and Klarič, 2013) . The referendum not only obtained 95 per cent Yes-votes, but also managed to bypass the 50 per cent participation quorum by 5 per cent (Bieler, 2015) .
Likewise, the success of the right2water ECI launched by EPSU at the same time as the successful water referendum campaigns in Berlin and Italy, was explained by its compelling general interest orientation (Bieler, 2017) , as well as its concrete political target (interview with Pablo Sanchez, Communications and Campaigns Officer, EPSU, November 2017).
By contrast, however, direct democratic union campaigns also failed to be successful, notably when they were seen as a special interest campaign without a particular target. The failure of the ETF to get enough signatures for its fair transport ECI can be explained by the combination of its narrow focus on the working conditions of a relatively small group of workers and a rather vague campaign focus, namely fair transport. In hindsight, the president of the ETF's railways section argued, it would have been better if the ECI had focused on the negative consequences of social dumping in the transport sector for the general population:
We would have reached broader sections of the population by saying that The argument favouring stronger emphasis on the general public, however, should not be overplayed either. First, the ETF also underestimated the organisational requirements for a successful ECI campaign: 'If we had worked on them some months longer before starting, it would have been certainly helpful' (Interview with Giorgio Tuti, President of the railways section of the EFT, August 2017). Secondly, a campaign focus on working conditions in a particular sector can also mobilise workers in this sector to get actively involved in such campaigns. In Swiss cantons and German Länder and municipalities, for example, retail workers played an active role in defeating longer shop opening hours by initiatives and referenda. Longer shop opening hours were also rejected by referendum in Italy (1995) and in Slovenia (2003) (Rehmet, 2017) . In 2011/2012, however, the technocratic Italian government led by Mario Monti found ways to totally liberalise shop opening hours by other means, namely by government decree (Pellegrini, 2012; Culpepper, 2014) .
Going on the offensive?
The examples discussed above seem to be fairly positive, but also largely defensive in character. However, what use is direct democracy for unions that want to go on the offensive? Here trade union experiences with direct democratic initiatives are quite mixed. The popular initiatives of Swiss unions for a shorter working week, longer holidays or high minimum wages recurrently failed to get popular support, arguably also because the opponents of the initiatives could argue that these issues should be dealt with by collective bargaining rather than At first sight, it may seem that CGIL lost. The referendum on Article 18 was not admitted and second referendum was sidestepped and vouchers were reintroduced. However, the mere fact that mainstream politics had recourse to undemocratic methods, to say the least, is a sign of weakness. The collection of 1.1 million signatures for each proposal is a great success in itself. It laid the ground for the 67 per cent approval ratings for CGIL's campaign on the reintroduction of vouchers in recent opinion polls.
3 Furthermore, the Gentiloni government had to acknowledge the union's support and therefore avoided further frontal confrontations with organised labour. Thirdly, the Gentiloni government reintroduced full joint responsibility along the subcontracting chain, as demanded by the third referendum.
Conclusion
The first section of this article showed that the holding of referenda -even when initiated from above -can represent an opportunity for unions to extract concessions from governments. After all, political leaders still require workers' support in order to win certain votes, as demonstrated, for example, by recent EU integration referenda across Europe. In some cases, unions were therefore able to conclude political exchanges with policy-makers that mirror some aspects of the corporatist compromises of the past, namely their involvement in social and political negotiations that go far beyond the confines of shop-floor employment relations. Switzerland provides the most prominent examples of using the EU integration issue as a lever to advance labour rights in exchange for union support in referendum debates. There are, however, also major differences between the political exchanges analysed by neo-corporatist industrial relations scholars and the political exchanges in a direct democracy. Whereas neocorporatist agreements require 'responsible' union leaders who are willing to sign agreements that may in fact be very unpopular among rank-and-file union members, the concessions offered to labour in a direct democracy must convince individual union members. As a result, the trade-off between the competing logics of 'influence' and 'membership' that neo-corporatist scholars invoke to discuss the dilemmas that union leaders are facing (Dølvik, 1997; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999) does not apply to political exchanges in a direct democracy. Instead, the direct democratic influence of trade unions is positively related to their capacity to mobilise their members and large sections of the public.
In addition, our review of referenda initiated from below shows that unions often use such procedures to prevent a worsening of working and living conditions. This is particularly evident when their campaigns have targeted public sector privatisations or a worsening of pension and other social security entitlements.
Success in these cases, however, very much depended on prevailing circumstances. Successful union campaigns did not focus on sectional interests nor did they present themselves as a left-wing political operation. Instead, the unions waged campaigns that emphasised the negative social impact for all citizens. As a result, their referenda campaigns were supported also by right-wing voters who also opposed the proposed cutbacks and privatisations (Bieler, 2017: 309; Afonso et al., 2010) . Comparing the role of unions in the Italian and Berlin water referenda campaigns and the corresponding right2water ECI, on one side, and the labour rights campaigns of CGIL and the fair transport ECI of the ETF, on the other, is instructive. In the water campaigns, unions were very active in the background but kept a relatively low profile in public. In contrast, the Italian and ETF labour rights campaigns were very much perceived as union campaigns. As we have seen, however, this strong labour focus was not without risks, as both the CGIL and the ETF campaigns risked being represented as special interest campaigns. Therefore, CGIL framed its campaign as a campaign for general workers' rights. By contrast, the fair transport ECI failed not only because the ETF arguably underestimated the organisational requirements, but also because it failed to inspire both union activists and larger sections of society. But precisely because successful direct democratic campaigns require both organisational strength and a capacity to mobilise people, unions may want to make increasing use of direct democratic instruments: not least because both alliances with centre-left parties and social partnership arrangements deliver fewer results than ever. Direct democracy is no panacea. There are occasions for political action, as there are occasions for industrial action. At times, however, the reluctance to choose between political and industrial action only benefited those that did not want to act at all (Gobin and Erne, 2017 
